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ON A THEOLOGICAL COUNTEREXAMPLE TO 
THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES 
David P. Hunt 
In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument 
for theological fatalism provides a counterexample to one of its own 
premises, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. David Widerker has 
recently urged in these pages three objections to my suggestion. I here 
argue that only the third of these objections raises a serious difficulty for my 
position, though even this difficulty is far from decisive. 
The classic argument for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and 
human freedom proceeds by showing that infallible foreknowledge pre-
cludes alternative possibilities, while IJFrankfurt-style" counterexamples to 
the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (or IJp AP") are supposed to show 
that an agent can be free (in the sense required for moral responsibility) 
even when alternative possibilities are unavailable. When juxtaposed in 
this way, it is clear that the latter has the potential to undermine the for-
mer. Call this challenge to the argument for theological fatalism the 
IJFrankfurt Objection," to distinguish it from other critiques of theological 
fatalism (based on the "Boethian" appeal to God's timeless eternity, the 
"Ockhamist" distinction between "hard"and "soft" facts about the past, 
and so on). What is less clear, but nevertheless compelling once it is 
noticed (or so it seems to me), is that divine foreknowledge provides its 
own counterexample to PAP, making the Frankfurt Objection to a consid-
erable degree independent from current controversies surrounding stan-
dard Frankfurt-style cOlmterexamples. 
T offered an initial argument for this position in an article in this journal.' 
A recent reply by David Widerker2 makes this an apt occasion for elaborat-
ing on my argument, especially since Widerker puts his finger on the very 
points at which other readers (at least those unpersuaded by my argu-
ment!) are most likely to balk. 
I 
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is perhaps best thought of as a fami-
ly of principles all of which make alternatives of some sort a requirement 
for moral agency. Frankfurt formulated the principle he aimed to refute in 
this way: 
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PAP A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he 
could have done otherwise.3 
The debate over PAP has led some to suggest that other formulations are 
more perspicuous, and Widerker specifically cites 
PAD An agent is morally responsible for his decision (choice, under-
taking) to perform an act A only if he could have avoided making if 
as the relevant principle in his reply to my paper. Given our interest in the 
implications of such principles for the argument for theological fatalism, which 
has traditionally been couched in terms of free agency rather than moral 
responsibility, an even more relevant formulation would be something like 
PAF A person is (libertarianly) free in his decision (choice, undertak-
ing) to perform an act A only if he could have avoided making it. 
Since differences between these formulations, important and even critical 
in some contexts, do not figure in Widerker's critique of my position, let's 
refer to all of them indifferently as 'PAP'. 
Frankfurt's argument against PAP, like the argument for theological 
fatalism, is concerned with the implications for moral agency of a situation 
in which a putative agent does something that is inevitable (given the cir-
cumstances). This allows for parallel formulations of the two arguments, 
something I presupposed but did not work out in any detail in my original 
article. Let me begin by remedying that lack, not only because the parallel 
is of independent interest, but also because an explicit comparison of the 
two arguments should make it easier to understand my thesis and 
Widerker's objections to it. 
Let's consider first the argument for theological fatalism. One standard 
way to construct the argument is this. First, posit an action, preferably one 
that looks initially like an uncontroversial instance of free agency. (If it 
doesn't look like a very good candidate for free action in the first place, the 
argument's contrarian conclusion won't hold much interest.) Second, 
appeal to the classic theistic concept of God (in its temporalist version), 
according to which the posited action was foreknown by God as long ago as 
one pleases, without any possibility of His being mistaken. Third, infer 
from God's infallible prior knowledge of this action that no alternatives to it 
were available to the agent. Fourth, introduce a principle like PAP which 
makes the availability of alternatives a requirement of free agency. Finally, 
conclude that the action is not free after all, despite the eleutheric virtues 
that made it look initially like such an attractive candidate. 
Following this recipe should result in an argument something like this: 
(J) Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(G) Before Jones was born, God knew infallibly that he would 
decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(I) It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn 
on August 15,2000. 
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(P) An agent X does an action A freely only if it was sometime 
possible for X not to do A. 
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(N) Jones does not freely decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
Call this 'The God Argument,' or TGA. There are, of course, many other 
ways that the argument for theological fatalism can be formulated; but the 
foregoing does the job, and does it in a way that makes the argument par-
ticularly amenable to comparisons with Frankfurt's argument. 
There are two respects in which TGA must be modified if it is to be 
transformed into a typical Frankfurt-style argument against PAP. In the 
first place, the two arguments appeal to different sources of unavoidability. 
In a Frankfurt-style argument, (G) is replaced with something like 
(F) Before Jones was born, a Frankfurt-device was programmed to 
ensure that Jones decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.5 
A "Frankfurt-device" is a mechanism capable of monitoring and/or 
controlling a person's mental processes to any required degree of preci-
sion. In the case premised in (F), the device is set to intervene in Jones's 
mental processes to bring about his deciding to mow his lawn on August 
15, 2000 if a certain triggering-event occurs, where this event is one that 
occurs if Jones (absent intervention by the device) is not going to decide to 
mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. Given this set-up, either Jones decides 
on his own to mow his lawn on August 15, or the device forces him to 
decide to mow his lawn on August 15; there is no alternative available to 
Jones in which he does not decide to mow on August 15. So (F), no less 
than (G), implies (I). Let's call this argument, in which TGA is modified by 
replacing (G) with (F), 'The Frankfurt Argument,' or TFA. 
Of course TFA is not Frankfllrt's argument-quite the contrary. To reach 
the argument that Frankfurt thought warranted by premises (J)-(I), one 
more modification is needed, this time in the argument's endgame. The 
point of positing a situation like the one set out in (F) is that we have at 
least some inclination here not to endorse the conclusion (P)-(N) when it 
comes at the end of TFA. While the argument's opening moves (if sound) 
do guarantee that Jones will decide to mow, one way he might decide to 
mow is by deciding to do so on his own, without the ministrations of the 
Frankfurt-device. If that is indeed how the scenario unfolds, and nothing 
happens to trigger the device's intervention, we may even have a pretty 
strong inclination to endorse a very different ending to TF A, modifying the 
argument as follows: 
(J) Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(F) Before Jones was born, a Frankfurt-de~/ice was programmed to 
ensure that Jones decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(I) It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn 
on August 15, 2000. 
(N*) Jones freely decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(P*) It's not the case that an agent X does an action Afreely only if it 
was sometime possible for X not to do A. 
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When unavoidability comes about through something like (F), Frankfurt 
maintained, our original confidence in the agent's freedom is unshaken. 
But then PAP must be false. Call this Frankfurtian argument, which ends 
with (N*)-(P*) rather than (P)-(N), 'TFA*'. 
Insofar as TF A * comes closer to our considered judgments than TFA, (F) 
qualifies as a (possible) counterexample to PAP; and insofar as (F)'s qualifi-
cations for this role survive the inevitable criticisms from PAP's defenders, 
thereby earning it promotion from possible to actual counterexample, PAP 
is no longer available as a reliable principle for use in TGA and similar 
arguments. In sum, acceptance of TF A * implies acceptance of P*; but this 
implies nonacceptance of TGA, which contains (P)-the contradictory of 
(P*)-as a premise. That's the obvious way to run the Frankfurt Objection 
to theological fatalism. 
The thesis of my earlier paper was that there is another, more direct way 
that this objection can go. Just as TFA* is more appealing than TFA, so the 
following argument (1 suggested) is more appealing than TGA: 
(J) Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(G) Before Jones was born, God knew infallibly that he would 
decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(1) It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn 
on August 15, 2000. 
(N*) Jones freely decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000. 
(P*) It's not the case that an agent X does an action A freely only if it 
was sometime possible for X not to do A. 
This argument-call it 'TGA *'-is just like TGA except that it ends with 
(N*)-(P*) instead of (P)-(N) (and just like TFA * except that it contains (G) 
instead of (F)). Frankfurt explained his (and what he assumed would be 
his readers') preference for TFA * over TFA as follows: the fact that the 
device stripped Jones of alternative courses of action "played no role at 
all in leading him to act as he did;" indeed, this fact "could have been 
subtracted from the situation without affecting what happened or why it 
happened in any way;" so this fact is "irrelevant to the problem of 
accounting for Uones's] action" and "does not help in any way to under-
stand either what made him act as he did or what, in other circum-
stances, he might have done."" But what is true of the device in (F) is 
equally true of God's foreknowledge in (G). (As Augustine puts it in The 
City of God, "a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he 
would sin."?) If this is correct-and I don't see how it can be denied-then 
(G) is itself a counterexample to PAP. 
If (F) is also a counterexample, well and good-the more the merrier. 
But perhaps (F) is deficient in some respect, as its many critics have 
urged. Then it's important that the Frankfurt Objection to theological 
fatalism does not depend on (F) or some scenario in the neighborhood of 
(F), but can appeal directly to (G), which differs from (F) at just those 
points where critics have found (F) most vulnerable as a counterexample 
to PAP.8 
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II 
Despite the evident advantages of basing the Frankfurt Objection to theo-
logical fatalism on a direct appeal to TGA * rather than a refutation of PAP 
via TFA *, Widerker believes that three serious objections can be raised 
against my proposal. 
(1) He notes in the first place that a proposed counterexample to PAP can 
succeed only if "Jones acts on his own and yet his decision to do A is 
unavoidable," and he claims that it is doubtful whether this requirement is 
really met when unavoidability results from divine foreknowledge. 
Perhaps so; at least I found it doubtful, before being persuaded otherwise. 
But why exactly does Widerker find it doubtful? His reason is that Jones's 
decision is "metaphysically necessitated" by God's prior belief, in the sense 
that (a) God's belief "is distinct from, and temporally prior to," Jones's deci-
sion, and (b) the former entails the latter; but necessitation of this sort "is 
incompatible with libertarian freedom." Certainly the libertarian would 
never concede Jones's decision to be a case of free agency if it were "nomical-
ly necessitated by a temporally prior fact." So why suppose, Widerker asks, 
that he would treat a case of metaphysical necessitation any differently?9 
It seems to me that this first objection is best understood as setting the 
stage for Widerker's second objection, since the first objection by itself does 
little to undermine the force of TGA *. The objection involves two crucial 
claims: (i) God's prior belief metaphysically necessitates Jones's subsequent 
decision; and (ii) metaphysical necessitation, like nomic necessitation, vio-
lates libertarian strictures on free agency. Neither claim, I believe, succeeds 
in blunting (G)'s efficacy as a counterexample to PAP. 
The first of these claims is surely true, given the understanding of 'meta-
physical necessitation' found in (a) and (b) above. (What makes the neces-
sity metaphysical is presumably its connection with metaphysically neces-
sary facts about God's knowledge, existence, and relation to time.) At least 
claim (i) had better be true if divine foreknowledge is to play its role as 
counterexample. As Widerker notes, one requirement for an effective 
counterexample to PAP is that it render the action in question unavoidable. 
But the only reason for thinking that divine foreknowledge renders its 
objects unavoidable-for thinking, in the case at hand, that (I) follows from 
(G) in TGA-is that once God forms the belief that Jones will decide to mow 
on August IS, there are no longer any metaphysically possible worlds in 
which Jones does not decide to mow on August 15.10 So if I want divine 
foreknowledge to render Jones's decision unavoidable, as it must do if it is 
to generate an effective counterexample to PAP, I need to insist on claim (i) 
rather than challenging it. It is worth noting further that one important 
weakness that critics (including Widerker) have urged against TFA* is that 
a counterfactual device like the one employed in (F) cannot effectively pre-
clude all alternatives to the actual sequence of mental events leading up to 
a particular action, leaving open the possibility of "flickers of freedom" 
that might be enough to satisfy PAP. But then it should be a virtue, not a 
vice, of (G) that divine omniscience precludes all alternatives to the actual 
future, and so precludes a fortiori all morally relevant alternatives. In sum, 
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the fact that God's belief necessitates Jones's decision, far from constituting 
an objection, instead certifies that (G) satisfies a critical desideratum of any 
good counterexample to PAP. 
But what about claim (ii)? There are two principal reasons why a liber-
tarian might think that nomic necessitation is incompatible with free 
agency. The first reason is simply that it rules out alternate possibilities. In 
this respect nomic and metaphysical necessitation are indeed on a par: if 
the one is incompatible with libertarianism just in virtue of precluding 
alternative futures, so is the other. But this ground for claim (ii) is dialecti-
cally inappropriate, since it amounts to nothing more than a reassertion of 
PAP, the very principle that is in question. My thesis, after all, is that (G), 
like (F), is a case in which we have (or on reflection ought to have) an intu-
ition that PAP yields the wrong result Obviously this thesis is not refuted 
simply by pointing out that Jones's decision to mow, given (G), does not 
satisfy PAP-it's not supposed to satisfy it. The thesis can be refuted only 
by undermining the force of the counterexample, and nothing in 
Widerker's first objection is equipped to do this. 
The second reason the libertarian might think that nomic necessitation is 
incompatible with free agency is that it locates a causally sufficient expla-
nation for the agent's behavior in conditions external to the agent (namely, 
natural laws and states of the universe prior to the agent's birth). This 
means that the agent is not the original source of the action; when tracing 
moral responsibility, the agent cannot serve as a little "first mover" to 
which we can point and declare, "the buck stops here!" But this reason 
provides no support for claim (ii), since nomic and metaphysical necessita-
tion (at least the sort of metaphysical necessitation entailed by infallible 
foreknowledge) are not on a par in this respect. The fall of a stone and the 
Fall of Adam are quite different, Augustine argued in On Free Choice of the 
Will, though both are necessary (given prior conditions). The former 
comes about when the stone's nature is subjected to external forces, while 
nothing about divine foreknowledge suggests that the foreknown action 
originates anywhere but in the agent. 
Just as your memory does not force the past to have happened, God's 
foreknowledge does not force the future to happen. And just as you 
remember some things that you have done but did not do everything 
that you remember, God foreknows everything that he causes but 
does not cause everything that he foreknows. Of such things he is 
not the evil cause, but the just avenger. 11 
While foreknowledge does precede its objects in the temporal order, it 
succeeds them in the logical or explanatory order. So this second libertarian 
complaint about nomic necessitation, a complaint which (unlike the first 
one) does not simply presuppose PAP, has no purchase on (G). 
The problem with Widerker's first objection, then, is that his first 
claim-that God's prior belief metaphysically necessitates Jones's subsequent 
decision-is consistent with (and even required by) the position he is cri-
tiquing, while his second claim-that metaphysical necessitation, like nomic 
necessitation, violates libertarian strictures on free agency-appears to rest 
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on little more than a prior commitment to PAP, the very principle that is at 
issue. But if Widerker's first objection fails to engage my argument, his 
second objection addresses it head-on. 
(2) The legitimacy of using TGA * to trump the theological fatalist's TGA 
clearly rests on whether one can apply to (G) the same judgments 
Frankfurt made about (F). This means, by way of review, that God's fore-
knowledge of Jones's decision "played no role at all in leading him to act as 
he did," "could have been subtracted ... without affecting what hap-
pened," "does not help in any way to understand ... what made him act as 
he did," and so on. Widerker sums up the essential idea this way: 
Jones would have decided in the same way and for the same reasons 
even if the factor that made it impossible for him to decide otherwise 
were absent. l2 
Widerker claims, however, that this is not the case in a divine fore-
knowledge scenario. Given (G), what is the closest possible world in 
which the factor that made it impossible for Jones to decide otherwise is 
absent? It's not a world in which God is absent, since God's existence is 
metaphysically necessary. Nor is it a world in which God fails to know 
what Jones will do, since omniscience is one of God's metaphysically nec-
essary properties. Instead, it is a world in which God exists and knows 
what Jones will do, but what He knows is different than what He knows in 
the original scenario, because Jones decides differently. But if this is how 
the modal facts lie, then it is false in (G) that "Jones would have decided in 
the same way and for the same reasons even if the factor that made it 
impossible for him to decide otherwise were absent." 
What should be said about this objection? Note first that Widerker's sum-
mary overlooks some of the other features of (F) that make us reluctant to 
count the unavoidability of Jones's decision against its freedom, namely, that 
the factor entailing unavoidability "played no role at all in leading him to act 
as he did" and "does not help in any way to understand ... what made him 
act as he did." These both seem true in (G) as well, even if we are persuaded 
by Widerker to withdraw the judgment that God's foreknowledge of Jones's 
decision to mow" could have been subtracted ... without affecting what 
happened." But it seems to me that the latter still captures something about 
(G) that is intuitively right. Even if God's nonexistence or nonomniscience is 
metaphysically impossible, I can at least imagine these states of affairs, and 
this may be all that is needed. Perhaps what is relevant when applying the 
"subtraction test" to a putative counterexample to PAP is that it be epistemi-
cally rather than alethically possible to subtract the factor in question. Even 
theists can (and sometimes, during a "dark night of the soul," do) entertain 
the possibility that God does not exist; less drastically, some theists not only 
entertain but actually hold the belief that God lacks infallible knowledge of 
future contingencies like Jones's decision to mow, and theists like myself 
who do accept infallible ornniprescience can nevertheless allow for the possi-
bility (however small!) that our judgment has been corrupted by a perfect-
being theology which reflects pagan neoplatonism rather than the authentic 
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teaching of Scripture. So it seems to me that I can perform a thought-experi-
ment in which God's foreknowledge of Jones's decision is subtracted from 
the situation, and that the result of mentally excising this item of knowledge 
(which after all plays no causal or explanatory role vis-a-vis Jones's decision) 
is that Jones's decision is completely wlaffected. The fact that this is not the 
result mandated by the standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals is 
not as troubling as it might otherwise be, since the Lewis-Stalnaker interpre-
tation of conditionals with impossible antecedents is widely regarded as 
unsatisfactory (or at least counterintuitive) in any case. 
Widerker's first two objections are natural ones to raise, and doubtless 
give expression to worries shared by other readers. I hope I have shown 
that they do not raise any serious difficulties for my position. 
Unfortunately, I cannot show this in the case of Widerker's third objection, 
since this one does point to a very real cost of endorsing TGA *, providing 
what is probably the strongest reason why an anti-PAPist like myself can 
never get entirely free from the allure of PAP. 
(3) Widerker points out that there is an independent argument for PAP 
which poses an embarrassing challenge for anyone who thinks that moral 
responsibility is compatible with infallible omniscience. Suppose, with 
Augustine, that Adam ate of the Tree of Knowledge U on his own," despite 
God's foreknowledge having rendered it necessary that he would do so. 
That he did it "on his own" rebuts one kind of challenge to Adam's moral 
responsibility; but the fact that Adam's action violates PAP leaves it open 
to another challenge. The following question can now be asked on Adam's 
behalf: what should he have done in the situation in question, so as to be able to 
escape moral blame? Given God's infallible foreknowledge, there is nothing 
else he could have done-but then it's hard to see how there could be some-
thing else he should have done. Widerker calls this the "What-should-he-
have-done? defense" or "W-defense" for short.13 
This is admittedly a very powerful consideration on the side of PAP; 
moreover, it does not appear to make any difference to the W-defense 
whether (I) is derived from (G), or from some other alternative-eliminator 
like (F) (or the assumption of universal causal determinism, for that mat-
ter). In my paper I drew attention to intuitions favoring TGA * over TGA; 
Widerker here draws attention to a central intuition favoring TGA over 
TGA *. Given this clash of intuitions, what should one do? 
I don't find myself capable of simply denying one set of intuitions. I don't 
think that the defenders of PAP should do so either. In another recent paper 
I observed that most PAPists, including Widerker, appear to accept (or at 
least leave unchallenged) the key moral claim underlying the Frankfurtian 
case against PAP. I called this the 'Master Intuition' and formulated it thus: 
(MI) Were S to A at t as part of a Frankfu.!!..?cenario-i.e., in circum-
stances such that S's A-ing at t satisfies PAP, there are conditions 
CN making S's A-ing at t unavoidable, and eN is not included in 
CcCS would be morally responsible for A-ing at t. 14 
(Here 'PAP' designates all the necessary conditions for moral responsibility other 
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than PAP and Co. comprises all the conditions which actually contribute toward 
S's A-ing at t.) What critics tend to challenge instead is the factual claim that (F) 
and similar stories really do constitute "Frankfurt scenarios" as this term is used 
in (MI); that is, they argue that every Frankfurt story that has, and indeed can, be 
told is such that either (i) some requirement for moral responsibility other than 
PAP is also violated, or (ii) the putatively unavoidable action is not really 
unavoidable, or (iii) the conditions which were effective in bringing about the 
aclion are not disjoint from but are m.<;tead among the conditions which made 
the action unavoidable. But whatever success these criticisms might meet when 
it comes to (F), they are quite implausible in the case of (G). Because divine fore-
knowledge leaves all the nonmodal facts about the foreknown action alone, it's 
hard to see what the other requirement cited in (i) might be. And while (ii) 
might be pushed on "Ockhamist" grounds, this is not a move that is available to 
a theological fatalist (whose position is overturned if the agent can somehow 
avoid the foreknown action), nor is it available to Widerker, a nonfatalist who is 
responsible for one of the most trenchant critiques of Ockhamism in the litera-
ture.ls Finally, (iii) is a nonstarter for reasons stressed earlier in this paper: there 
is absolutely no reason to think that the divine foreknowledge that renders the 
action unavoidable makes any contribution at all to bringing about the action. 
So it seems to me that the supporter of PAP should have just as much trouble 
denying the intuition that an action rendered unavoidable by divine foreknowl-
edge may nevertheless be (libertarianly) free as I have denying the intuition that 
this agent is entitled to make use of Widerker's "W -defense." 
If I can't simply deny the pro-PAP intuitions fueling the W -defense, there 
are nevertheless a couple of things 1 can do to try neutralizing them. (I leave 
it to Widerker and friends to say how the intuitions favoring my position can 
be neutralized.) One is to insist that the W-defense, despite its superficial 
appeal, rests on an outmoded notion of moral responsibility. If Frankfurt's 
critique of PAP is really cogent, then the question "what should 1 have done 
to avoid blame?" is a piece of misdirection: an agent is responsible for what 
she originates (in some fairly robust and possibly complex sense), even if 
alternative courses of action are not available to her. "Passing the buck" is 
therefore a legitimate exculpatory strategy in a Frankfurtian ethics, inasmuch 
as it corrects a faulty assumption about the agent's originative role. But the 
W-defense is irrelevant (except insofar as the agent's inability to do other-
wise is traceable to outside interference-in which case the agent is entitled to 
pass the buck, making the W-defense unnecessary.) This first response to 
the W-defense, however, strikes me as excessively revisionist. If it were the 
only strategy available to me, 1 would be sorely tempted to jettison TGA* in 
favor of TGA. Fortunately there is another strategy, which does not require 
abandoning the hoary maxim that "ought implies can." 
This second response to the W-defense rests on doubts about how well 
standard possible-worlds models succeed in capturing what it is that a per-
son can or could or has the power to do. These doubts are not ad hoc, driven 
simply by the adoption of a position on the problem of divine foreknowl-
edge v. human freedom. When I find that 1 can't "bring myself" to do 
something-e.g., douse my daughter with lighter fluid and set her on 
fire-it's not quite right to say that 1 lack the power to do so. There are, to be 
sure, logically, metaphysically, and even nomically possible worlds in 
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which I perform this horrendous deed; but the availability of such worlds 
isn't why it's inappropriate to attribute to me a lack of power. One way to 
see this is to consider a parallel case having to do with God, where there 
are no alternative possibilities at all that might legitimate the ascription of 
power. Given God's essential goodness, for example, it may be that there 
is no possible world in which He personally undertakes to torture an inno-
cent child. (Add essential omniscience so that He doesn't just fail to know 
what He is doing). But it's odd to conclude that He lacks the power to do 
something of which even finite human agents are capable. 
Interestingly, a recent paper in this journal on the vexed question of 
how best to analyze divine omnipotence points in this direction as wel1.16 
Erik Wielenberg considers an unexcellably strong individual named 
'Hercules' who demonstrates his strength by lifting incredibly heavy 
stones, only to fail when asked to lift a lO-lb. stone coated with grease. 
This is no evidence against Hercules' strength, Wielenberg observes, since 
it's the slipperiness of the stone rather than a lack of strength that accounts 
for Hercules' failure. Taking the case further, 
imagine that we have somehow acquired a ten pow1d stone that is 
essentially slippery. It is so slippery that no human can grip it, and so 
no human can lift it. Let's assume that Hercules is essentially human. 
It follows that there is no possible world in which Hercules lifts this 
stone. Yet it seems clear that Hercules is strong enough to lift the 
stone-even though it is metaphysically impossible that he do SO.17 
The moral Wielenberg draws is that the following supposition, which 
underlies most analyses of power, is in fact mistaken: 
If x cannot bring about p then x lacks the power to bring about p.1R 
Perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of such challenges to conventional 
wisdom lies an explanation of how it can be true both that Adam's eating of 
the Tree of Knowledge was metaphysically necessary (given God's prior 
knowledge of what he would do) and that Adam should (and could) have 
done otherwise. 
My sense, for what it's worth, is that the availability of alternative 
futures is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility and free 
agency, though it is (under ordinary conditions) a highly reliable marker 
for some deeper factor (having to do with the initiation of action) which is 
a necessary condition for moral agency. (G) offers an extraordinary con-
text in which the availability of alternatives is not a reliable marker, mak-
ing TGA * a better argument than TGA; and there may be F-devices such 
that the same is true of (F). But I do not have a rich and intuitively satisfy-
ing account of this deeper factor, and without such an account I cannot 
show that the intuitions behind the W-defense must play second fiddle to 
those expressed in (MI). There is much that remains deeply baffling about 
moral agency, as Prof. Widerker would doubtless agree. 
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